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Mihailis E. Diamantis 
Illusions of Affection 
A Hyper-Illusory Account 
of Normative Valence 
Abstract: This article challenges the orthodox position that some 
smells are pleasantly fragrant and some tactile sensations are painful. 
It proposes that the affective components of our experiences are a 
kind of illusion. Under this alternative picture, experiences that seem 
to have positive or negative affect never actually do. Rather, the 
affective component is hyper-illusory, a second-order misrepresenta-
tion of the way things actually seem to us. While perceptual hyper-
illusions have elicited scepticism in other contexts, affective hyper-
illusions can withstand common critiques. Focusing on the para-
digmatic affective experience — pain — the article situates the hyper-
illusory account within the existing scientific and philosophical 
literature. Several theoretical advantages of positing a hyper-illusory 
structure to affective experiences emerge from the discussion. 
Could it be that all pains are, in some sense, figments of our imagina-
tion…? (Hardcastle, 1999, p. 13) 
1. Introduction 
Many everyday experiences leave us unmoved. Others seem to have a 
strong hedonic or affective component. Fetid odours and sharp pains 
seem to have an unmistakable repugnance. Sweet smells and caresses 
seem to be pleasant. We may call this apparent hedonic component the 
Correspondence: 
Professor Mihailis Diamantis, College of Law & Department of Philosophy, 
University of Iowa, Boyd Law Building, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. 
Email: mihailis-diamantis@uiowa.edu 
 
 ILLUSIONS  OF  AFFECTION 7 
normative valence of the experience and describe the possible 
valences as positive or negative. The orthodox position is that sensory 
experiences often have their own positive or negative normative 
valence. 
I argue in this article that there is good reason to doubt the orthodox 
view and maintain instead that the normative valence of our experi-
ences is illusory. More specifically, I propose that the apparent norma-
tive valences are hyper-illusory — illusions in the way our experi-
ences seem to us. This would not necessarily mean that normative 
valence drops out of the psychological picture altogether. Illusions 
exist even if their referents do not. Bodily ‘pains’ and olfactory 
‘pleasures’ could still be importantly different from unvalenced 
sensations, but their psychological structure would be more complex 
than commonly supposed, consisting of first-order sensory experi-
ences and second-order misattributions of normative valence. 
In the next section, I define more carefully what hyper-illusions are 
and discuss why they may initially strike us as, at best, bizarre possi-
bilities. I then lay out the hyper-illusory account of normative valence 
in Section 3 and suggest why such hyper-illusions are less trouble-
some than hyper-illusions in other contexts. Section 4 presents two 
case studies illustrating how the account fits within available 
empirical data about normative valence. Section 5 turns to the exten-
sive philosophical literature on the paradigmatic affective experience 
— pain. It situates the hyper-illusory account among extant theories. 
Because the account only describes the structure of pain’s normative 
valence and does not offer a complete theory of pain, it is compatible 
in principle with several contemporary views on what pains are. As 
such, the account could be a tool available to a wide range of pain 
theorists. The article closes in Section 6 by describing several 
advantages of adopting a hyper-illusory theory of pain’s affect, noting 
how the account easily explains many theoretically troublesome 
features of pain. 
2. What are Hyper-Illusions? 
Illusions are situations where things seem different than they actually 
are. The Müller-Lyer lines, for example, seem to be different lengths 
when, in fact, they are the same length. A hyper-illusion is a situation 
in which the way things seem to seem is not the way that they actually 
seem (Block, 2007). 
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A bit more terminology may help. I shall distinguish orders of 
seeming. A first-order seeming is an experience of the way the world 
is. The contents of first-order seemings consist of ordinary experi-
ential properties like those associated with the standard senses. In 
looking at a stop sign, I see it to be red; that is to say, it first-order 
seems to be red. 
A second-order seeming is an introspective experience of a first-
order seeming1 (Lambie and Marcel, 2002). The contents of second-
order seemings are also experiential. Continuing the stop sign 
example, to the extent that I have a second-order seeming at all, it will 
likely seem to me that the stop sign seems red, or, more succinctly, the 
stop sign will seem to seem red. 
Ordinary illusions result from a discrepancy between first-order 
seemings and the world. In the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion, the 
lines first-order seem to be different lengths. Since they are in fact the 
same length, there is a discrepancy between the first-order seeming 
and the way the world is. Hyper-illusions are the result of a 
discrepancy between first- and second-order seemings. If a stop sign 
first-order seems red to me but second-order seems green, then I am 
experiencing a hyper-illusion. 
Are there any hyper-illusions? Can a stop sign really seem red but 
seem to seem green? It could if there were a failure of the intro-
spective process that generates second-order seemings. Despite com-
pelling evidence of introspection’s shortcomings, many still hesitate to 
doubt its accuracy (Descartes, 1637/2008; 1641/1993; Armstrong, 
1963; Brentano et al., 1995; Lycan, 1996; Chalmers, 2003). Even for 
theorists who are more sympathetic to evidence of introspective 
failure, hyper-illusory states may seem suspect. An analogy to belief 
may help explain why. Suppose I simultaneously have two beliefs: 
first that it is sunny out, and second that I believe it is cloudy. Such 
epistemic states are easy enough to describe and occasionally to 
diagnose in someone else (as when someone believes her partner is 
unfaithful but does not believe that she believes it). But they are hard 
to imagine first-personally (Wittgenstein, 1953). This is in part 
because of the transparency of beliefs, including second-order beliefs 
 
1  I am not alone in speaking of introspection in quasi-perceptual terms (Locke, 1690/ 
1836; Kant, 1781/1999). While a quasi-perceptual gloss on introspection makes hyper-
illusions easy to describe, I could equally define hyper-illusions in terms acceptable to 
any theory of introspection that concedes introspection has some experiential content 
and is sometimes fallible. 
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(Evans, 1982; Byrne, 2011; Gertler, 2011). On the rare occasion that 
we explicitly consult our second-order beliefs (‘Do I believe my 
partner is unfaithful?’), we typically do so in the same way we form 
our first-order beliefs: by directly enquiring into the way the world is 
(‘Is my partner unfaithful?’).2 It is hard to imagine in any vivid, first-
personal way circumstances in which the contents attributed by the 
second-order belief and the first-order belief’s actual contents contra-
dict each other. Doing so would require envisioning a scenario in 
which you would simultaneously answer the same question (‘Is my 
partner unfaithful?’) in two contradictory ways. This is the classic 
pragmatic paradox of self-deception: acknowledging a fact (‘My part-
ner is unfaithful’) and simultaneously suppressing it (‘But I believe 
she’s faithful’). 
It is even more difficult to vividly imagine oneself in the grips of a 
hyper-illusion (Nagel, 1974). While the self-deception necessary to 
form false second-order beliefs may be difficult, hyper-illusions, like 
the stop sign that seems to seem green, may appear impossible to 
induce absent some abnormal neurological condition. Perceptual 
experiences, including introspective experiences, are widely thought 
to be transparent (Ryle, 1949; Byrne, 2012). Second-order experiences 
are not self-presenting; they are, so to speak, diaphanous to the first-
order experiences they are about (Harman, 1990; Martin, 2002). The 
same is true of first-order experiences, which are transparent to the 
states of affairs they are about (Shoemaker, 1994; Siewert, 2004; 
2012). At the personal level, we use the same procedure to see 
whether a stop sign is red and whether it seems red — we just look at 
the stop sign (Evans, 1982). Because of the supposed transparency at 
both orders, hyper-illusions like a stop sign that seems to seem green 
might (mistakenly) appear to entail simultaneously undergoing con-
flicting experiences. And that is hard to imagine first-personally. 
Hyper-illusions could exist even if they are difficult to imagine from 
the first-person perspective. Some cognitive scientists claim to have 
found examples in various forms of change-blindness (Dehaene et al., 
2006). As Ned Block argues, these examples are unconvincing (Block, 
2007). But, as I propose below, hyper-illusory experiences of 
 
2  I will also speak of first- and second-order seemings in representationalist terms 
because I find it most natural. I assume in what follows only that experiences bear the 
representational content I attribute to them. I do not assume that the representational 
content exhausts the phenomenal character of experience (Block, 2003). 
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normative valence are different, in part because there is less reason to 
think that they would be as offensive to the purported transparency of 
introspection. 
3. Normative Valence as Hyper-Illusory 
Suppose that you have just eaten something that you would naturally 
describe as tasting repulsive. In the terminology introduced above, the 
taste seems to you to have a negative normative valence. I will assume 
that the negative normative valence is at least in part experiential.3 
According to most orthodox accounts (as discussed more extensively 
in Section 5), that experience is a first-order seeming. In this section, I 
describe an alternative possibility, consistent with available evidence, 
according to which the experience of normative valence is a hyper-
illusory, second-order seeming. 
Here is how the explanation of your experience of a repulsive taste 
would go on the hyper-illusory picture I am proposing. You have a 
first-order taste experience — the sensory core — characterized non-
normatively in terms of a few basic dimensions of taste experience, 
e.g. sweet, sour, salty, and bitter (McLaughlin & Margolskee, 1994).4 
The first-order taste experience, on this account, has no normative 
valence. However, the taste does seem to have a negative normative 
valence; it seems to be repulsive. The second-order experience is as of 
experiencing a negatively valenced taste. Since, on this account, there 
is a discrepancy between the first-order seeming (no normative 
valence) and the second-order seeming (normatively valenced), your 
experience of negative normative valence — the repulsiveness of the 
taste — is hyper-illusory. 
Hyper-illusory experiences of normative valence should raise fewer 
coherence objections than the sorts of hyper-illusions previously 
 
3  One could reject this supposition if one thought that normative valences are judgments 
about first-order experiences to the effect, for example, that the first-order experiences 
are repulsive or pleasant. I will not engage this possibility beyond saying I doubt it can 
be right. I do not think that the negative valence of, for example, pain sensations can be 
explained merely in terms of negative judgments about pain sensations. It seems that 
pain is felt to be repulsive, not merely judged to be so. After all, I can judge your pain to 
be repulsive, but such a judgment will not affect me in the way that the repulsiveness of 
my pain does. The immediate urgency and motivational force of my pain seems most 
naturally explained, at least in part, by an experience of repulsiveness, rather than solely 
by a negative judgment, which I can also make of your pain. 
4  In the literature on pain (discussed below), some theorists refer to the sensory core as 
the ‘cognitive base’ (Teroni, 2019). 
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considered. This is because the transparencies of experience and 
introspection do not entail the same conflicting perceptual commit-
ments where second-order seemings of normative valence are con-
cerned. In the hypothetical stop-sign example, the second-order 
experience as of a green stop sign fails to match the first-order experi-
ence by representing it as having experiential qualities that conflict 
with the experiential qualities it actually has. The conflict is due to the 
familiar conceptual impossibility of something being, or seeming to 
be, both red and green at the same time.5 But hyper-illusory experi-
ences of normative valence bear a different relationship to the first-
order experiences they represent. The second-order experience does 
not represent the first-order experience as having a phenomenal 
character that is incompatible with the one it actually does have. 
Rather, the second-order experience represents the first-order experi-
ence as having a phenomenal character along a dimension on which 
the first-order experience is silent, i.e. makes no representation. In the 
taste example, the first-order experience is not positively-, negatively-, 
or even neutrally-valenced. It has no normative valence at all. The 
content of the second-order experience supplements, but does not 
strictly speaking conflict with, the content of the first-order taste 
experience. 
There is no conflict because, as Hume (1739/1896) noted, one 
cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. The non-normative qualities of 
the first-order experience cannot stand in a relation of conflict, 
directly or implicitly, with the normative ones the second-order 
experience represents the first-order experience as having. So there is 
no conceptual impediment to a particular taste profile (which has no 
inherent normative valence) being attended by a positive, negative, or 
neutral normative valence, or no normative valence at all. This is not 
to say that introspection has not failed in some respect when it 
produces a hyper-illusion of normative valence. Hyper-illusions, after 
all, are still a species of illusion. But perhaps the failure is easier to 
swallow as a coherent possibility since the normative valence that 
introspection represents the first-order experience as having supple-
ments — or, as Hume might say, ‘gilds’ — rather than contradicts, the 
character the first-order experience actually has (ibid.). As one theorist 
 
5  Not all agree that this is a conceptual impossibility (Hardin, 1988). Nothing in this 
article hinges on the particularities of the stop-sign example, and suitable substitutes 
should come to mind easily for those who disagree with the conceptual claim. 
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put the point, ‘[affective] experiences do not make genuine property 
attributions to bodily locations — so they do not have full veridicality 
conditions’ (Aydede, 2019b, pp. 703–4). 
4. The Hyper-Illusory Account is Consistent 
with Available Empirical Evidence 
So far, I have only shown that the hyper-illusory theory of normative 
valence is a theoretical possibility. I will now argue that the theory 
harmonizes with available empirical evidence. If the hyper-illusory 
account is true, we would expect to see evidence of a disconnect 
between first-order experiences and the second-order experiences that 
represent them as having a normative valence. Several studies 
demonstrate this possibility. In the studies I discuss below, subjects 
report varying normative valences despite there being good reason to 
think the sensory core of the experiences remains fixed. This should 
establish the prima facie plausibility of the hyper-illusory account of 
normative valence. A fuller defence appears in Section 6. 
4.1. Case study: Olfaction 
Studies in olfaction reveal that factors seemingly irrelevant to the 
sensory core of scent experiences can affect the accompanying norma-
tive valence. For example, past experiences can affect the apparent 
normative valence of odours (Schaal et al., 1997). Our affective 
responses to scents are largely conditioned early on; babies, who have 
not undergone such conditioning, have little in the way of natural 
scent preferences (Kahn, 2001). National origin, which presumably 
shapes early conditioning, influences the normative valence people 
associate with scents in predictable ways. Accordingly, one study 
finds that a negative valence accompanies the scents of fermented soy-
beans and dried fish for Germans, but a positive valence accompanies 
them for Japanese, and vice versa for the scent of anise (Ayabe-
Kanamura, 1998). An attractive explanation of these data is that both 
groups experience the same first-order sensory core, but, perhaps due 
to different cultural conditioning, they undergo divergent second-order 
representations of normative valence. On the hyper-illusory story, 
both groups are within the grips of a hyper-illusion, but cultural 
conditioning influences which hyper-illusion they experience. 
The hyper-illusory account becomes more attractive still in intra-
personal studies. In one experiment, subjects were asked to sniff a 
series of scented compounds, among them a test compound made of 
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isovaleric acid and cheddar-cheese scent (de Araujo et al., 2005). 
Before presenting each scent, experimenters showed subjects cards 
with words written on them. Subjects then ranked the apparent 
pleasantness of the scent after smelling it. The words ‘Cheddar 
Cheese’ or ‘Body Odour’ preceded two presentations of the test odour 
combination. Subjects consistently ranked the test odour as seeming 
significantly more pleasant when presented with the ‘Cheddar Cheese’ 
card as opposed to the ‘Body Odour’ card. These results have been 
independently replicated with a different chemical compound and the 
words ‘Parmesan Cheese’ and ‘Vomit’ (Herz and von Clef, 2001). 
Since these cases involved intrapersonal comparisons, it is safe to 
assume that the core sensory experience of the scent remained the 
same across trials, though the circumstances modulated the accom-
panying normative valence. If the consistent first-order scent experi-
ence itself included the normative valence, such modulation would be 
hard to explain. 
4.2. Case study: Pain 
Pain is the paradigmatic negatively-valenced experience. Tradition-
ally, pain theorists assumed along with Kripke that there is never a 
gap between the experience of pain and actually being in pain (Kripke, 
1980). A hyper-illusory account would say the exact opposite: that 
there is always an appearance/reality gap because the first-order 
bodily experiences that appear to be painful never actually are. Like 
seemingly normatively valenced scents, empirical data show that there 
is a very malleable relationship between the sensory core of pain 
experiences and the accompanying normative valence. 
Most pain theorists think the sensory core of pain consists of tactile 
experiences indicative of tissue damage — pressure, cutting, scraping, 
heating, etc. If they are right, we have long had evidence that the 
sensory core of pain and its negative valence can diverge. A variety of 
factors that bear no relation to the sensory core of pain can modulate 
how negative the associated valence is: culture, past experience, 
perceived meaning of the situation, and feelings of control (Melzack 
and Wall, 1973). For example, the same injuries will seem less 
negatively valenced when subjects believe they are in control of the 
source of injury (Linden, 2015). 
Hypnosis and genetic defects can widen the gap between sensory 
core and normative valence even further. Subjects can be conditioned 
through hypnosis to experience no negative valence at all when, for 
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example, parts of their body are exposed to freezing temperatures 
(Price, 2000). The subjects still experience the extreme cold but, 
judging from their first-person reports, no longer experience con-
current negative valence.6 Individuals suffering from analgesia are 
born with this deficit. They usually die at a young age, having 
accidentally, and unknowingly, worn their bodies down through 
repeated injury. Paul Brand and Philip Yancey describe the case of 
four-year-old Tanya: 
She was healthy in every respect but one: she did not feel pain. Nerves 
in her hands and feet transmitted messages about changes in pressure 
and temperature — she felt a kind of tingling when she burned herself 
or bit her finger — but these carried no hint of unpleasantness. (Brand 
and Yancey, 1993, pp. 3–5) 
Tanya apparently experienced the sensory core of pains (tingles, 
temperature increases, etc.), but always divorced from any negative 
valence (Barber, 1959). 
Some pain theorists now think the sensory core of pain is a more 
complex phenomenon that involves not just tactile sensation, but also 
a separate pain sensation, or nociception (Grahek, 2007). This account 
is not uncontroversial (Klein, 2015), but even if true, there is evidence 
that negative affect and core sensation (now touch plus nociception) 
come apart as the hyper-illusory account would predict. Patients who 
suffer from pain asymbolia are like those discussed above in that they 
do not experience negative affect when presented with painful stimuli, 
while they do experience the tactile sensory core. Unlike those 
suffering from other pain disorders, however, pain asymbolics report 
nociceptive experiences along with the tactile sensory core. ‘Neurol-
ogical and psychological testing showed conclusively that the ability 
to recognize pain upon noxious stimulation [i]s fully preserved… But 
all consistently fail… to display any affective or motor responses to 
painful stimuli’ (Grahek, 2007, p. 43). Those who study pain 
asymbolics typically quote their patients saying things like ‘I feel it 
indeed; it hurts a bit, but it doesn’t bother me’ in response to noxious 
stimuli like pinpricks (ibid., p. 45). Pain asymbolics often smile or 
laugh during pain testing because of ‘their inability to perceive or 
 
6  This characterization of the experiments is accurate, even if Ernest Hilgard is correct 
that some ‘hidden observer’ still experiences the aversiveness of the cold (Hilgard, 
1977). The observer in control of speech mechanisms reporting his experiences still 
feels the cold but does not experience the sensation as aversive. 
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experience the pain they feel as a threat, danger, or damage’ (ibid., p. 
75). 
5. Situating the Hyper-Illusory Account 
There are many battlelines in the literature on normative valence. In 
particular, philosophers of pain have thoroughly carved up the 
theoretical terrain into increasingly finer plots. Situating the hyper-
illusory account of normative valence — as applied to pain — within 
this existing literature will clarify the account’s commitments and, as 
importantly, its non-commitments. Since the account is neither a 
complete theory of affect nor a self-standing theory of pain, it is in 
principle compatible with several existing views on the nature of pain. 
A hyper-illusory approach to pain would simply provide a partial 
story of the psychological structure of pain experiences. It would say 
that the normative valence of pain experiences enters the picture 
through second-order, introspective access to first-order experiences 
that are not themselves normatively valenced. The normative valence 
of pain is therefore a type of illusion. 
5.1. Among discussions of affect and illusion 
This is not the first proposal to connect illusions and pain, though such 
discussions are rare because many philosophers think pain experiences 
must be self-intimating. Valerie Hardcastle discusses a wide range of 
‘pain illusions’ and accounts for them as ‘shortcuts in [psychological] 
computing… that inevitably fail us under certain conditions’ 
(Hardcastle, 1999, p. 127). The hyper-illusory account offered here, 
however, is different from Hardcastle’s illusions. She refers to 
situations where people experience tissue damage without also experi-
encing negative normative valence, or situations where people experi-
ence some negative painful normative valence without any accom-
panying experience of tissue damage. On a hyper-illusory account, the 
first sort of case would not be illusory at all because first-order 
experiences of tissue damage are not normatively valenced. The 
second sort of cases would not, as described, be ‘failures’; rather, they 
would encompass all pain experiences, which universally lack (first-
order) affect. 
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Louis Charland (2005), writing about emotion, has offered perhaps 
the closest analogue to a hyper-illusory approach to pain.7 Charland’s 
central claim is that ‘valence understood as hedonicity (pleasure or 
displeasure) is not an intrinsic objective property of felt affect in first-
order emotion experience. Rather, it is a property of second-order 
emotion experience that is highly variable and fundamentally indeter-
minate’ (ibid., p. 233). Though he does not speak in terms of illusion, 
Charland’s account of emotion’s ‘hedonicity’ seems to have a hyper-
illusory psychological structure. 
However, even if Charland’s account were generalized to all norma-
tive affect, it would differ in material respects from the hyper-illusory 
account offered here. For example, Charland draws heavily on the 
work of Robert Solomon and Lori Stone (2002), according to whom 
normative emotional valence is always a matter of interpretation and 
the application of some scheme of meaning. The relevant second-
order process seems, on Charland’s view, to be cognitive and cog-
nitively demanding. Channelling Lambie and Marcel (2002), he calls 
it ‘a kind of reflexive knowledge’ (Charland, 2005, p. 243). While it 
may be possible to develop the hyper-illusory account of normative 
valence along these lines,8 as I discuss below, that is not the only 
option. When adapted to pain rather than emotion, Charland’s 
commitments on this front would face some familiar problems. It may 
be plausible that all creatures capable of experiencing something 
complex like emotional hedonicity are also capable of cognitively 
demanding interpretive tasks like those Charland describes. The same 
cannot be said of pain, which is a more promiscuous experience. A 
Charland-inspired account would face another problem common to 
cognitivist accounts of pain — explaining what many take to be pain’s 
inherently motivational nature. Knowledge and beliefs standing alone 
do not generally have motivational force. 
Charland’s picture also has an anti-scientific orientation that is not a 
necessary part of a hyper-illusory account. He believes his account 
‘threatens the scientific foundation of descriptive theories of affect’ 
(Charland, 2005, p. 235). According to him, ‘[t]he fundamental nature 
 
7  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to Charland’s book 
chapter. 
8  This, too, may be doubtful. If the second-order state that interests Charland is a kind of 
knowledge or belief, it is not immediately clear that it could properly be called ‘illusory’ 
(as opposed to just ‘false’). Tye (1997) lays out one account of pain along these lines. It 
is not without its difficulties (Aydede, 2019b). 
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of valence must therefore remain a scientific mystery’ (ibid., p. 248). 
On his view, emotional affect poses an even deeper challenge to 
scientific accounts of the mind than even the hard problem of con-
sciousness: ‘The difficulties posed by the scientific explanation of 
affect valence appear to be of a different order. This is not simply a 
hard problem for the science of mind. It may constitute a genuine 
inexplicable mystery’ (ibid., p. 251). While there could be hyper-
illusory accounts of pain that are not amenable to scientific enquiry, I 
mean for hyper-illusions to help demystify pain’s normative valence. 
As discussed in the previous section and the next, I believe science 
can help. 
5.2. Among theories of pain 
A hyper-illusory approach to pain’s affect is compatible with the 
broad strokes of many existing positions in the philosophy of pain. For 
example, while the hyper-illusory account of normative valence 
naturally lends itself to eliminativst views of pain, nothing forces it to 
deny that pain exists as a scientific natural kind or as the referent of a 
useful folk concept (Corns, 2015). From Daniel Dennett (1978) 
through Valerie Hardcastle (1999), eliminativists about pain have 
been motivated by counter-examples scientists have discovered to 
various purportedly core features of pain experience, like its infalli-
bility, its essentially negative affect, and its reference to tissue 
damage. Hardcastle in particular warns against reductively ‘identify-
ing pain with the [negatively valenced] experience of pain’ and 
instead advocates focusing on the bundle of mechanisms our brains 
have for processing diverse streams of nociceptive information 
(Hardcastle, 1999, p. 162). The hyper-illusory account makes no claim 
(conceptual or empirical) about whether pain is reducible to its 
familiar negative valence, is essentially negatively valenced, or is 
identifiable with multiple or single streams of information processing. 
Rather, it simply maintains that, for those pains that have a negative 
valence (which may or may not be all pains), negative valence is not 
(contrary to second-order appearances) a property of the first-order 
experience. A realist theory of pain could embrace the hyper-illusory 
account by identifying pain with features of second-order experience 
or with more complex combinations of first- and second-order 
experiences.  
Since the hyper-illusory account of normative valence does not 
import a substantive view of pain, it is consistent in spirit with many 
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theories of what pains are. For example, representationalists about 
pain believe that the phenomenology of pains is identical to some 
intentional content (Cutter, 2017). Unlike most representationalists, 
however, a hyper-illusory version would locate the relevant inten-
tional content in some second-order, introspective state. A hyper-
illusory approach could also port over to a perceptualist account of 
pain. It would not work for existing perceptualist theories that view 
pain as a kind of first-order perception of some external condition of 
the body, e.g. tissue damage (Armstrong, 1962; Park, 2017), but the 
account could be adapted to a perceptualist view that focuses instead 
on inner percepts. 
Mixed theories of pain see pain as a complex consisting of at least 
two mental elements, one perceptual and one affective.9 Such multi-
dimensional views dominate the scientific literature (Corns, 2018). 
Many mainstream mixed theories are in structure (if not always in 
detail) consistent with the hyper-illusory account of normative 
valence. Their two-part framework maps well onto the hyper-illusory 
picture, which divides experiences involving normative valence into a 
first-order sensory core and a second-order misattribution of affect. 
Adverbialist theories of pain, which identify pain with a specific 
manner of somatosensorily perceiving tissue damage, are amenable to 
a hyper-illusory rendition if the relevant ‘manner’ entails some sort of 
concurrent second-order awareness (Aydede, 2017; 2019a). Evalua-
tive theories identify the affective component of pain with some sort 
of evaluation. On one prominent rendition, pains are experiences that 
simultaneously represent a bodily disturbance and represent it as bad 
(Bain, 2013; 2017b; Teroni, 2019). But with a slight modification,10 a 
hyper-illusory account could emerge — pains would be first-order 
experiences that represent bodily disturbance combined with a second-
order evaluative experience representing those experiences as bad. 
The second-order evaluations would be truth-apt, but always false 
(Bain, 2013). 
 
9  Admittedly, the line between single-element and mixed theories of pain is not always 
clear cut. I do not mean the typology I offer here to be definitive, as nothing of sub-
stance to this article turns on it. It is for expository purposes only. 
10  Bain (2017b, p. 41) is emphatic that his ‘[e]valuativism is a first-order view’. ‘[O]n 
standard Evaluativist views, subjects do not have, in addition to that first-order evalua-
tive representation, any second-order representation (evaluative or otherwise) which 
would take that first representation as in intentional object. In this sense, unpleasant 
pains are claimed to be first-order intentional experiences’ (Mitchell, 2019). 
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The hyper-illusory account of normative valence is not universally 
compatible with mixed theories of pain. Imperatival theories, for 
example, identify the affective components of pains with mental states 
containing imperatival contents, something like ‘Stop having that 
bodily disturbance’ (Martinez, 2011; Hall, 2008). Even if the impera-
tive content inheres in a second-order mental state — ‘Stop having the 
bodily disturbance represented by that experience!’ — the content 
could not be illusory; imperatives have satisfaction conditions, but not 
truth conditions (Bain, 2017a). Psychofunctionalist theories also do 
not lend themselves easily to hyper-illusory construal. These identify 
the negative affect of pain with ‘a certain causal/psychofunctional 
role’, something like ‘being motivationally biased’ away from the 
source of the experience (Aydede and Fulkerson, 2015, pp. 34–5; 
Gray, 2018). Like commands, functions are not truth-apt; they lack 
representational content of the sort that the hyper-illusory account 
requires. 
In sum, the hyper-illusory account of normative valence offers a 
novel view of the psychological structure of pain’s affect. It could be 
adopted by realists and eliminativists alike. Among realist theories, 
the account is compatible with any theory of pain that allows the 
affective component of pain to have some representational content and 
to be a second-order mental state. Such theories include representa-
tionalism, perceptualism, adverbialism, and evaluativism. The hyper-
illusory account is likely incompatible with imperitivalism and 
psychofunctionalism. 
6. Assessing the Hyper-Illusory Account 
It is one thing to lay out the hyper-illusory account of normative 
valence as a theoretical possibility, compatible with several existing 
theories. It is quite another to show that it is a view worth holding. 
There are some potential theoretical bullets that the view must bite. 
These, however, are paired with some significant theoretical benefits. 
Once again focusing on what the view brings to pain theory, I show 
that a hyper-illusory approach offers elegant solutions to some 
persistent challenges. 
6.1. Bullet biting 
First, the bullets. The hyper-illusory account of normative valence will 
strike some theorists as prima facie implausible because it seems con-
trary to the first-person phenomenology of pain as a simple, unified 
 
20 M.E.  DIAMANTIS 
experience. This is precisely the intuition that the hyper-illusory 
account calls into doubt. As already discussed, the developing science 
of pain continues to strain the credibility of this first-person 
phenomenology.  
Still, it would be helpful if the hyper-illusory account had some 
explanation of why the illusion of first-order affect seems so com-
pelling. On one promising approach, attentional binding could 
collapse first- and second-order experiences so that, at the personal 
level, ‘intentional objects of experience come to be experienced as 
themselves pleasant or unpleasant’ (Lambie and Marcel, 2002, p. 
244). ‘Ample connections exist in the brain to integrate nociception 
with emotional response very easily’ (Hardcastle, 1999, p. 118). Con-
sequently, ‘[d]istinguishing among emotional, sensory, and cognitive 
responses is quite difficult to do. They all run together in the brain’ 
(ibid., p. 114). In the ordinary course (though not always), our brains 
attribute negative affect to painful experiences ‘automatically and 
mostly at the subpersonal level — what happens at the personal level 
is that the subject is simply struck by the positive or negative import 
of what is presented to her by the cognitive base’ (Teroni, 2019, p. 
103). 
An alternative explanation would draw on the transparency of intro-
spective experiences, which present themselves as ‘immediate con-
sciousness’ of the first-order experience (Strawson, 1988).11 Consider 
a loose analogy to Humean moral projectivism. For Hume, human 
activity, such as torturing small animals, has no inherent moral 
quality. However, such activities may induce emotional responses in 
us, e.g. abhorrence. We then project these sentiments onto the activity 
itself, so that we come to see activities like cat torture as abhorrent in 
themselves (Hume, 1751/1907). Affective hyper-illusions may do 
something similar, though at a higher psychological order. On this 
account, first-order experiences sometimes induce in us second-order 
experiences that represent the first-order experiences as normatively 
valenced. Then, by a (likely evolutionarily hardwired) psychological 
sleight of hand induced by the transparency of experience, the norma-
tively valenced phenomenology of second-order experiences is pro-
jected onto first-order experiences so that the latter seem themselves 
to be normatively valenced. The first-order experiences are, to use 
 
11  It should be noted that Aydede (2019b) denies that pain experiences are transparent. 
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Hume’s term, ‘gilded’, and thereby mistakenly made to seem as if 
they are themselves pleasant or repulsive. 
Under the hyper-illusory account of normative valence, the 
seemingly painful affect of first-order pain experiences is illusory. For 
theorists who are committed to viewing pain as essentially a first-
order psychological phenomenon, this would mean that pains do not 
really have any affect. In this respect, the hyper-illusory account 
would go even further than Hardcastle (1999), who forcefully argues 
that pain should not be identified with negative affect because there 
are some pains that lack it. That presents a prima facie problem for the 
account. As Jennifer Corns has worried: ‘If it is simply denied that 
pains have affective character, one may begin to suspect that the sub-
ject has been changed’ (Corns, 2018, p. 746; 2014). Any account of 
pain that casts doubt on pain’s affect may have difficulty explaining 
what many take to be basic features of pains — that they both 
(defeasibly) motivate and (defeasibly) justify behaviour aimed at 
stopping it (Bain, 2013).12 
The most effective response on behalf of a hyper-illusory approach 
would be to embrace a more complicated picture of pain as (usually) 
consisting of both first- and second-order psychological phenomena. 
Then the account need not deny that pains have affect. The affective 
component could be identified with a second-order introspective 
misrepresentation of the first-order experience as having negative 
normative valence. There would still be a further question of whether 
that second-order state could satisfy the felt, motivational, and 
justificatory features typically associated with pain’s affect. The 
plausibility of an affirmative answer would turn on a more detailed 
account of what the second-order state is. As discussed in the previous 
section, an account of the second-order state could draw on a number 
of existing theoretical templates. It could be an inner perception of the 
sensory core, or a way of introspecting the sensory core, or an 
evaluation of the sensory core as bad. A hyper-illusory account would 
thereby inherit many of the familiar strengths and weaknesses of 
perceptual, adverbialist, or evaluativist theories. My claim is not that 
any of these would ultimately win the day for a hyper-illusory 
account. It is just that, in proposing that pains might have a hyper-
illusory structure, ‘the subject has [not necessarily] changed’. 
 
12  It should be noted that there is far from universal agreement that any available theory of 
pain can accommodate both features. 
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Even for those who insist that pain is a purely first-order psychol-
ogical phenomenon, there are several considerations that could soften 
the blow of denying that pain has affect. Psychological evidence 
suggests that many pain theorists have overly fetishized pain’s justi-
ficatory and motivational roles, and perhaps pain’s affect along with 
them. ‘[P]ain science has revealed the correlation between bodily 
disturbances of any sort as yet specified and pains as reported to be 
surprisingly weak’ (Corns, 2018, p. 742). As a result, ‘many, perhaps 
even most, pains misrepresent the objective bodily badness of the 
disturbance’ (ibid.). Chronic back pain, which usually has no identi-
fiable physiological cause, is one example (Hardcastle, 1999). Many 
headaches and growing pains might be others. For motivational roles, 
too, ‘there is good evidence… that affect and motivation doubly 
dissociate at both the sub-personal and personal levels. If that is right, 
then the assumptions about the motivational profile of pains’ affect 
which underwrite all three dominant theories of pain should be 
abandoned’ (Corns, 2018, p. 748). 
It must also be remembered that the hyper-illusory account purports 
to apply to all experience of normative valence, not just the affect of 
pain. Much of the force behind Corns’ intuition that the subject would 
have changed if one were to deny that pains have affect is the thought 
that pains are archetypal examples of affective states — ‘If any 
experiences have normative valence, then surely pains do!’ The hyper-
illusory account denies the antecedent. It is not just pains whose first-
order normative valence the hyper-illusory account calls into question, 
but also the feel of gentle caresses, the sound of soothing tones, and 
taste of rancid morsels. Situated in this context — a total reworking of 
the purported psychological structure of affect — the conclusion about 
pains specifically may seem less outlandish. 
Lastly, it bears noting that the hyper-illusory account has some 
reputable company in pain theory among views that reject pain’s first-
order phenomenological affect. Desire theories of pain are mixed 
theories that divide pain experiences into a perceptual sensory core 
and a desire that the perception cease (Armstrong, 1968). Similar to a 
hyper-illusory account, ‘[d]esire theorists take pains to be neutral 
sensory experiences’ (Bain, 2013, p. S73). Related observations might 
be made of psychofunctional views, for which the functional role of 
pain’s sensory core provides pain’s affective element. 
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6.2. Possible advantages 
Hyper-illusory adaptations of existing theories of pain could help 
transform some present philosophical challenges into expected 
features.13 For example, a hyper-illusory approach opens the possi-
bility of providing an account of pain’s affect that unifies it with an 
overall theory of affect. ‘We should strive for a unified (or at least not 
too fragmented) account of valence’ (Teroni, 2019, p. 110).  
A hyper-illusory approach may also help with an enduring challenge 
to most realist theories of pain — to explain the double dissociation 
between the sensory core and the negative affect of pain (Hardcastle, 
1999, p. 105). ‘Any theory of pain is going to have to explain why our 
peripheral sensors for noxious stimuli are not well connected to our 
sensations of pain’ (ibid., p. 124). This dissociation is not only a con-
clusion reached by pain science. Studies into the folk concept of pain 
also reveal that people widely agree that pain hallucinations are possi-
ble, i.e. feeling a pain as hurtful even though it is not hurtful (Sytsma 
and Reuter, 2017). 
Far from being a surprising result, Section 3 explains how such 
dissociations do not call for special explanation on a hyper-illusory 
account. ‘The [sensory-discriminative and affective-motivational sub-
system neural] pathways remain largely segregated… [O]ur pain 
system is complex and contains at least a duality of subsystems’ 
(Hardcastle, 1999, p. 103). The affective element of pain (such as it is) 
enters the picture on the hyper-illusory account only when there is a 
second-order awareness of the experience’s sensory core. Con-
sequently, during moments of stress (e.g. fleeing from a threat) (ibid., 
p. 134) or under hypnotic suggestion (ibid., pp. 184–8), when second-
order awareness may be directed elsewhere, reflexive responses to 
damaging stimuli may persist even in the absence of any reported 
negative affect. Conversely, the affect of pain is present on a hyper-
illusory account whenever the right sort of second-order psychological 
state attributes the right sort of negative normative valence. Since all 
such attribution is misattribution, it should be unsurprising on a hyper-
illusory picture that there can be hurtful sensations even in response 
something that is not harmful (Sytsma and Reuter, 2017), such as 
 
13  The discussion that follows is purposefully gestural. I merely hope to make a prima 
facie case for several advantages of a hyper-illusory approach to pain that would 
warrant further investigation. Fully justifying any of the purported advantages would 
require much more rigour and many more (unavailable) journal pages. 
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chronic back pain (Hardcastle, 1999) or allodynia (in which gentle 
caresses can trigger excruciating pain responses) (Baine, 2013). In 
theory, a hyper-illusory account of painful affect could even 
accommodate cases in which non-proprioceptive sensations (like 
certain visual or auditory experiences) are reported as painful (Gray, 
2018) and perhaps even cases where there is pain but no specific 
locatable first-order experience to which it refers (Plomer, Freund and 
Schnitzler, 1999). 
On a related note, the hyper-illusory account is well positioned to 
accommodate data on the cognitive penetrability of pain experiences, 
i.e. that top-down effects can modulate the experience of pain’s 
negative affect. Several studies show that higher-level cognitive pro-
cesses, such as judgment and memory, can influence the contents of 
first-order experiences (Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999; Stefanuci and 
Geuss, 2009; Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014). These studies are con-
troversial, as is the precise characterization of what count as top-down 
as opposed to bottom-up effects (Shea, 2014). However, there is 
mounting evidence showing that ‘beliefs [about] bodily conditions can 
influence the unpleasantness of the pains those conditions cause’ 
(Bain, 2017b, p. 43). Indeed, pain scientists have shown how expecta-
tions about the normative valence of an impending sensation (e.g. of 
innocuous heat) can flip the reported normative valence of the experi-
ence (Leknes et al., 2013). As Hardcastle (1999, p. 170) put it: ‘If we 
believe that pain is eminent, then we are more likely to feel pain and 
report stimuli as painful. If we are expecting something pleasurable, 
we are more likely to experience pleasure.’ Such cognitive penetration 
may seem far-fetched where our low-level perceptual mechanisms are 
concerned. As such, they pose a challenge to accounts of pain that 
locate pain in purely first-order psychological phenomena (Hardcastle, 
2015). Cognitive penetration is a much easier sell for higher-level 
mental processes, like the sort of introspective awareness that the 
hyper-illusory account says is the starting point for pain’s negative 
affect (Lambie and Marcel, 2002). 
The hyper-illusory account can make short work of what seem to be 
conflicting intuitions and manners of speaking about pain: that pains 
are objects of experience and that they are experiences themselves 
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(Aydede, 2019a).14 Most accounts of pain opt for one intuition at the 
expense of the other. Aydede and Fulkerson (2015, p. 28), for 
example, write: ‘What is pleasant or unpleasant [in pain] are experi-
ences, not the objects of those experiences.’ Bain (2017b, p. 41), by 
contrast, ‘explains pains’ unpleasantness in terms of states directed at 
the extramental world, not at other mental states’. Hardcastle (1999, p. 
107) notes that identifying pain with either component ‘assum[es] that 
pain is simpler than it is’. On a hyper-illusory approach, the affective 
element of pain could be both an experience (the second-order hyper-
illusion) and an object of the experience (the first-order state misrepre-
sented as having a negative normative valence). Both intuitions could 
be simultaneously true. 
Finally, a hyper-illusory approach to pain offers an interesting way 
of explaining what seems to be the self-intimating nature of pain 
experiences. Hardcastle believes ‘[w]e need some independent reason 
to believe that sensory experiences or introspective reflections or 
whatever are, in fact, infallible’ (ibid., p. 155). A hyper-illusory 
account can explain why ‘[t]here doesn’t seem to be any room for a 
possible gap between the appearance of pain and being in pain’ 
(Aydede, 2019a). Strictly speaking, on a hyper-illusory account, pain 
experiences are far from self-intimating. While first-order sensations 
may second-order seem to have negative normative valence, they 
never actually do. So, there is always a gap between the second-order 
order psychological appearance and the first-order psychological 
reality. However, being in pain, on the hyper-illusory account, is a 
matter of being subject to the second-order illusion that one’s first-
order experience is painful. Illusions are self-intimating! The reality 
of one’s being in the grips of an illusion just is the state of it falsely 
appearing to one that things are a certain way. 
7. Conclusion 
In this article, I have sketched the possibility of a hyper-illusory 
account of normative valence. According to this theory, our first-order 
experiences are normatively silent while our second-order experiences 
of them sometimes falsely represent them as having a normative 
valence. Available empirical evidence is consistent with the hyper-
 
14  Sense-datum approaches to pain can also account for both intuitions easily, but such 
approaches seem (unlike hyper-illusory accounts) to be committed to controversial anti-
physicalist metaphysics (Aydede, 2019a). 
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illusory account as are several theories of pain, the paradigmatic 
affective experience. Because of the several further advantages I 
describe, the hyper-illusory account offers a perspective on the 
structure of pain and other affective experiences that could be 
attractive to range of theorists. 
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